Truth in Advertising and The Great Dollarization Scam by Thomas D. Willett
February 2001 









Truth in Advertising and  
 







THOMAS D. WILLETT 
Claremont McKenna Colleges  
and 







  working paper 2001-05
Economics papers by faculty at Claremont Graduate
University, Claremont Institute for Economic Policy
Studies, Claremont McKenna College, Drucker School
of Management, Harvey Mudd College, Lowe Institute,
Pitzer College, Pomona College, and Scripps College.  1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Advice on international currency policies has long been subject to fad and fashion.  In the 
1970’s it was flexible rates.  In the 1980’s the pendulum swung back to pegging with the use of 
exchange rates as nominal anchors.  In the 1990’s the restoration of interest in currency boards 
was the hot concept, to be replaced at the beginning of the new millennium with dollarization.  
This should not be the cause of great surprise.  Many areas of policy are subject to frequent 
swings in conventional wisdom.   
The complicated nature of the theory of optimal currency policy makes it particularly 
susceptible to such swings.  Relevant considerations include virtually all of the major areas of 
dispute concerning domestic macroeconomic policies plus a number of additional complications 
that are purely international.  To make matters even more difficult the theory of optimum 
currency areas (OCA) shows that the best policy will vary from one country to another.
1  Thus it 
is not surprising that the debate among economists over fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
shows little sign of coming to a close. 
The media and policy markets are rather thin for economists who stress the complicated 
nature of the issues involved in reaching sound judgments about currency policies.  Far more in 
demand are those one-armed economists who cut through the morass of often conflicting criteria 
to shout, “here are the one or two that really matter and here’s what they imply for policy.”  This 
can at times be a highly desirable strategy from the standpoint of promoting public as well as 
personal interests.  A major way that science progresses is for unusually clear thinkers to cut 
through the mass of detail to help clarify for the rest of us where the key issues lie.   
                                                 
*Helpful comments from Nancy Auerbach, Aida Budiman, James Dean, and Art Denzau are greatfully 
acknowledged. 
1 OCA theory was pioneered by Robert Mundell although the idea was implicit in some earlier work.  For a recent 
treatment and references to the large literature on this subject see Willett (forthcoming).   2
All too often in the public arena, however, such simplifications lead to the promotion of 
preconceived policy strategies rather than to great insight.  For example, it is clearly established 
in the international monetary literature that some types of shocks are usually better handled 
under fixed exchange rates and some types under flexible.  Many empirical studies which have 
attempted to determine which types of shocks have predominated for various countries over 
different time periods.  In the public policy debates, however, one all too frequently finds 
advocates of fixed or flexible rates discussing only the types of scenarios where the theoretical 
literature suggests that that regime is optimal.  Thus even in direct debates it is not uncommon to 
see advocates talking past one another. 
Often these one or two factor approaches are almost pure propaganda.  Sometimes, 
however, they make important contributions by emphasizing a new or relatively neglected 
consideration.  Sadly such new considerations are often presented as a complete analysis rather 
than as an additional factor that should be integrated into the existing literature.  It would of 
course be to deny human nature to expect that someone who develops a new angle would not be 
likely to overemphasize its importance.  It is a normal obligation of fellow researchers to attempt 
to put such new developments in better perspective as well as to point out cases where policy 
advocates have overstepped the bounds of appropriate discourse by using faulty logic or ignoring 
relevant considerations or distorting evidence.  This is the purpose of this paper with respect to 
recent advocacy of dollarization. 
Limitations of both space and energy preclude a full survey of the recent literature.  Thus 
I shall focus primarily on the influential papers of Ricardo Hausmann who was until recently the 
chief economist of the Inter American Development Bank.  Along with his colleagues at the 
IADB and Guillermo Calvo and Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland, Hausmann’s   3
research has made important contributions to the analysis of the benefits of dollarization and the 
costs of flexible exchange rates.  
2  However, I will argue that Hausmann’s contributions fail the 
truth in advertising test.  His influential paper in Foreign Policy  (Hausmann, 1999) fits the 
format of a debater’s oratory or a lawyer’s brief far more closely than it does the logic of sound 
policy analysis.  Nor do his contributions to the IADB’s recent conference volume give a 
substantially more balanced view.  A strong case can be made that dollarization is a desirable 
option for some countries in Latin America, but the costs and benefits involved would vary 
greatly across countries. 
2.  DISCLOSURE OF THE RECOGNIZED BIASES OF YOUR REVIEWER 
  Before beginning my evaluation, the reader might fairly want to ask what is the basis for 
my implicit claim to the position of a disinterested observer.  The postmodernists remind us that 
no scholarship can rightly claim complete objectivity, so let me admit my biases openly.
3  I am a 
big fan of both fixed and flexible exchange rates, but each in its proper place.  My strongest bias 
is a firm belief in the validity of the optimum currency area approach to exchange rate issues.  I 
acknowledge that the list of criteria relevant to OCA analysis has grown to the point that they do 
not always point to a clear-cut choice.  This approach, however, provides important insights that 
are robust to variations in the details of OCA analysis.  A key point is that one size does not fit 
all.  Automatic alarm bells should go off anytime it is argued that the same currency policy is 
best for all countries or even for all countries in a particular region.  For example, currency 
boards can be quite useful for some countries – typically quite small ones like Estonia and 
                                                 
2 Many of the recent contributions to the analysis of dollarization may be found in two edited volumes Dean, 
Salvatore, and Willett (forthcoming) and Fernandez Arias and Hausmann (2000).  These volumes also contain 
certain extensive references to the other literature on this subject. 
3 Of course I can only own up to those biases of which I am aware.  Recognition that no analysis can be 100 percent 
objective doesn’t imply that we shouldn’t try to come as close as possible, nor that we can make useful, albeit not 
completely precise, evaluations of the degree of objectivity of policy analyses and scientific research.   4
Lithuania  – but to advocate currency boards as a savior for almost any country, as a few 
economists have done, makes snake oil salesmen look good by comparison. 
A second strong advantage of the OCA approach is that, if taken seriously, it is a 
powerful antidote to the dangers of intellectual hubris that sometimes overwhelm members of 
our profession.  The problem is that those most susceptible to the hubris bug seldom take OCA 
analysis seriously.  We do have some fairly useful tests for the disease, however.  Does the 
advocate consider more than one or two criteria on which the choice of currency policy should 
be based, and do they acknowledge that there will be some costs as well as benefits to the 
recommended strategy?  Affirmative answers to these questions are not a guarantee of relatively 
objective analysis, but negative answers provide a virtual guarantee that snake oil is on offer. 
3.  SOME EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF RECENT DOLLARIZATION ANALYSIS 
Hausmann et al., and Calvo and Reinhart have contributed a number of interesting 
empirical findings.  Some of these appear to be very solidly based.  One example is that even 
under flexible rate regimes many countries still pay considerable policy attention to exchange 
rates, often intervening heavily and/or using interest rate to reduce currency fluctuations.  This 
has occurred even for countries such as Chile whose officials have offered strong defenses of the 
desirability of their flexible rate regime.  Such indications of Calvo and Reinhart’s “Fear of 
Floating” should be surprising, however, only to t hose limited few who have ideological 
commitments to pure floats.  It is a greatly underappreciated implication of OCA theory that 
most countries should pay at least some attention to their exchange rate in setting domestic 
macro economic policy.  Adopting fixed exchange rates is an extreme where countries must give 
heavy weight to the foreign exchange market in setting domestic macro policy even in the short 
run and 100 per cent weight over the longer term.  The extreme opposite of virtually ignoring the   5
exchange rate in setting domestic macro policy should apply only to the largest most closed 
economies.  In between the extremes, the smaller and the more open the economy, and the 
greater is the degree of currency substitution, the greater is the weight that should be given to 
foreign exchange market developments in setting domestic macro policy. 
The key in all such intermediate situations is that the exchange rate should be neither the 
overriding constraint over domestic policy nor should it have zero influence.  OCA theory gives 
important clues about the weight that should be given to the exchange rate, but not about the 
form that such intermediate systems of managed exchange rate flexibility should take. 
For this latter issue, questions of the degree of capital mobility, the behavior of 
speculation, and the ability of government officials to carry out exchange rate policies free of 
short-term political pressures come to the fore, along with the pattern of shocks that is 
emphasized in OCA theory.  We have clear evidence to support the view, often called the 
unstable middle or the hollowing out hypothesis in the form that substantial capital mobility 
makes narrow band adjustable peg regimes highly unstable.  The resulting one way speculative 
option makes them  prone to large capital flows which, while stabilizing in the technical 
economic sense of putting pressure on exchange rates to move toward equilibrium, can be highly 
disruptive.  The stronger versions of this view that capital mobility rules out the stability of all 
regimes except the extremes of free floating and fixed rates does not fit with the empirical 
evidence, however.  There are many examples of managed floats and crawling bands that have 
worked well (see, for example, Burdekin, Nelsen and Willett (1999) and Williamson (1996) and 
(2000).  Thus the accurate observation that many countries have a quite rational fear of free 
floating does not logically imply that all such countries need to adopt genuinely fixed rates. The 
reader of Hausmann’s [1999] policy paper is not made aware of this.  He discusses only floats   6
and the adoption of an international or supranational currency.  An especially careful reader 
might notice that after dismissing floating Hausmann goes on to consider “an” rather than “the 
only” alternative to floating. (p. 75).  Thus his analysis does not actually commit the logical 
fallacy of ignoring relevant alternatives.  It is surely highly misleading, however, as is the failure 
to even hint that the case for particular currency regimes is likely to vary from one country to 
another. 
A second seemingly robust finding of the recent literature is that countries with fixed 
exchange rates tend to have both lower nominal and real interest rates.  This is certainly what we 
would expect theoretically.  It must be remembered, however, that this is not a clinching 
argument for fixed rates, as advocates sometimes seem to suggest.  Rather it is one of a number 
of considerations that should be factored into a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. 
Another point suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) has less supporting evidence to 
date but seems quite likely to be confirmed by additional evidence.  Exchange rate volatility 
appears to have a much stronger depressing effect on the trade of emerging markets than for 
industrial countries.  The failure of flexible rates to lead to the collapse of trade among the 
industrial countries as predicted by some of the strongest critics combined with the failure of 
most empirical studies to find large effects has lead to a widespread view that the resource 
allocation costs of exchange rate fluctuations are minor.  While likely closer to the truth than the 
exaggerated claims of some critics that the widespread adoption of flexible rates would cripple 
trade, the view that currency fluctuations imposed almost negligible costs has been almost 
certainly overstated.  Defenders of flexible rates correctly point out that for the industrial 
countries the short run and perhaps even the medium term effects of currency fluctuations can be 
easily hedged at minimal costs.  This route is much less available for most emerging markets.    7
Thus as Calvo and Reinhart (2000) point out, we should not be surprised that the few studies 
available so far on the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on trade volumes for emerging 
markets tend to find them to be much larger than for the industrial countries.
4 
Two other recent research findings for Latin America are particularly intriguing.  One is 
that contrary to the policy prescriptions of OCA theory, countries facing large terms of trade 
shocks have frequently chosen fixed exchange rates.  A second, which is more in line with 
traditional theory, is that countries with fixed rates have substantially larger financial sectors than 
those with flexible rates.  Both of these findings should stimulate further research to test how 
robust they are to different specifications and to the inclusion of countries beyond Latin 
America. 
The second is that monetary policy appears to have been more procyclical under flexible 
than under fixed exchange rates for Latin America.  “Hence the empirical record in Latin 
America does not argue in favor of a more stabilizing monetary policy under flexible regimes, 
even in periods of low inflation” (Hausmann et al (2000) p. 147).  Such evidence provides a 
useful reminder that discretionary monetary policy is often not used wisely.  It does not by itself, 
however, argue for fixed over flexible exchange rates.   
The correct implication is that there is a strong case for limiting the effects of short-run 
political pressures on monetary policy making.  Contrary to the suggestion of some enthusiasts 
for dollarization, fixed exchange rates are not the only way to provide discipline over domestic 
policy.  Indeed the degree to which fixed rates are the first through nth best way to provide 
monetary discipline depends largely on the criteria laid out in OCA theory such as the size and 
openness of the economy, the degree of its wage and price flexibility and factor mobility, and the 
                                                 
4 Note that even if the trade effects of switching from adjustable pegs to flexible rates are small, the effects of going 
from either to genuinely fixed rates could still be quite large.  Recent research suggests that this may be the case.    8
patterns of shocks.
5    Thus to a substantial extent, the disciplining argument for fixed rates does 
not present an independent criterion over and above the traditional OCA criteria. 
The primary exception to this conclusion is where domestic political instability and the 
weaknesses of domestic institutions are so great that drastic externally oriented action such as 
dollarization is the only type of feasible option for imposing discipline.  This worst case scenario 
argument for dollarization seems to fit well the case for Ecuador.  For many countries, however, 
macro economic discipline would be better achieved through domestically oriented institutional 
reforms such as limitations on the size of budget deficits, central bank independence, and 
inflation targeting. 
Another argument made by Hausmann et al (2000) is that for Latin America , flexible 
exchange rates instead of generating more monetary independence and making domestic interest 
rates less sensitive to foreign interest rates domestic interest rates become more sensitive.  This 
may be possible under particular circumstances, but it is hard to see how this would generally be 
the case and Hausmann et al present no convincing, theoretically argument no convincing 
theoretical arguments.  They present estimates on average for countries in their sample of three, 
the response of domestic interest rates to changes in U.S. interest rates are the least for the fixed 
rate country, Argentina, and the most for the flexible rate country, Mexico, with the crawling 
band country, Venezuela, falling in between.  They report, but do not discuss, the size of their 
estimated coefficients.  The actual magnitudes, however, strongly suggest a misspecified 
equation to which little, if any, policy weight should be given.  The case of zero insulation that 
one would expect from perfect capital mobility under fixed exchange rates would yield a 
coefficient of 1.0.  The estimated coefficient for Argentina, however, is 1.45, while for 
                                                                                                                                                             
See, for example, Frankel and Rose (2000). 
5 See Westbrook and Willett (1999)   9
Venezuela and Mexico they are 2.77 and 5.93 respectively.  Correlation need not imply 
causation.  It is totally implausible to think that a 100 basis points increase in U.S. interest rates 
would normally cause an almost 600 basis point increase in interest rates in Venezuela. 
Hausmann et al [2000] also present results for a sample of 11 Latin American countries 
for the period 1960 to 1968.  They again find smaller effects under fixed rates, although the 
difference is not statistically significant.  It is likely true that the adoption of flexible rates does 
not give countries as much effective domestic interest-rate independence as many advocates of 
flexible rates initially assumed and of the heavier is official intermediation the less will be the 
independence of domestic interest rates.  Theory suggests that the amount of independence given 
by flexible rates should vary according to country characteristics and the degree of intervention.  
Hausmann et al [2000] do not test for such differences across countries or time.  Their work does 
suggest the importance of further research on the insulation effects of alternative currency 
regimes, but on the basis of the evidence they present, it takes a heroic leap to reach their 
conclusion that “In fact, floating seems to amplify the domestic effects of external [interest rate] 
movements” (p. 149). 
Hausmann et al [2000] also argue that the formal or de facto indexation of wages to 
exchange rate changes in Latin America implies that nominal currency depreciation will be 
highly inflationary and will be relatively ineffective in promoting change in real exchange rates.  
They conclude, “therefore, flexible regimes face heavy costs when they attempt to improve 
competitiveness through depreciation” (p. 153).  One can certainly cite important episodes in 
Latin American experience where this has been the case.  Again, however, theory would suggest 
that the inflationary effect of currency depreciation would not be constant across either countries 
or time.  We would expect these effects to vary depending both on the degree of openness of the   10
economy and the degree of monetary accommodation that the authorities are expected to 
provide.  It is quite interesting to note that neither the Mexican depreciation in 1994-95 nor the 
Brazilian depreciation in 1999-2000 set off the types of cumulative spurts of wage inflation 
predicted by critics of flexible rates. 
It is just not legitimate for the analysis of currency policy issues to treat Latin America as 
if it consisted of a group of completely homogeneous economies.  Yet that is what the study by 
Hausmann et al [2000] repeatedly does.  Furthermore, excessively strong conclusions are drawn 
from many of the findings and an even-handed balancing of costs and benefits is absent.  The 
research paper by Hausmann et al [2000] makes a number of valuable contributions to the 
analysis of currency policies, but it presents a guise of objectivity that is not lived up to.  In the 
introduction the authors describe their paper as asking, “…what the appropriate exchange rate 
arrangement for Latin American countries should be.  It reviews the theoretical classic mode in 
favor of each regime and checks whether the empirical record is consistent with these claims” (p. 
131).  This certainly seems to suggest that the analysis to follow will be of the relatively neutral 
and objective type that one should expect from the Office of the Chief Economist of a major 
international financial institution.  While the marks for some of the research contributions of this 
paper should be quite high, its truth in advertising score is painfully low. 
4.  THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: LIABILITY DOLLARIZATION 
For some time, monetary economists have understood that the degree of international 
currency substitution is an important factor that must be added to the list of important OCA 
criteria.  With high degrees of currency substitution, the liquidity value of the domestic currency 
is sharply diminished.  In these circumstances, the ability of an independent currency to insulate 
the domestic economy from shocks is undermined and flexible rates could be highly unstable.     11
Recently writers such as Calvo and Reinhart and Hausmann have stressed the importance 
of liability dollarization as well.  Many emerging markets have very limited or non existent long 
term markets for financial instruments denominated in domestic currency and most foreign 
borrowing is denominated in foreign currency (liability dollarization).  If dollar-denominated 
borrowing is not hedged then currency depreciation can wreak havoc with the solvency of major 
segments of the economy.  There can be little question that the severity of the Asian crisis of the 
late 1990’s was affected by this factor.  However, the use of pegged exchange rate regimes was a 
major stimulant to unhedged foreign borrowing by the Asian countries.  The adoption of flexible 
exchange rates would help diminish, although not completely nullify, this problem.   
The older OCA literature considered the role of high capital mobility and concluded that 
while it clearly pushed optimal currency regimes away from the middle ground of narrow band 
adjustable pegs, the effects on the desirability of fixed versus flexible rates was ambiguous.  The 
new literature suggests that to the older criteria of degree of openness in trade and currency use, 
we must also add openness in financial markets  in terms of the patterns of currency 
denomination, both with respect to trade financing and longer term lending and borrowing . This 
has of course been at least implicitly understood by policymakers for some time and helps 
account why countries like Hong Kong and Lithuania who do not have strong trade ties with the 
U.S. still decided to fix to the dollar and why Thailand put a much heavier weight on the dollar 
in its currency basket peg than could be accounted for by trade linkages to the U.S.  Still it is an 
important point which deserves greater attention now being given to it.   
There can be little question that such financial market issues deserve a prominent place in 
the list of important OCA criteria.  At present, however, we know fairly little about their 
quantitative importance in relation to other criteria.  The magnitude of the insolvencies generated   12
by the Asian currency depreciation is likely to give an exaggerated impression of how far this 
consideration should tip the balance in favor of dollarization or some other form of genuinely 
fixed exchange rates, since the size of currency mismatches was likely due in considerable part 
to the adoption of pegged, not flexible rates.  The comparative effects of flexible exchange rates 
on the magnitude of currency mismatches is an important area for research.   
Perhaps more important for forward-looking policy issues is the degree to which private 
hedging facilities could be used without drastically curtailing international capital flows and 
what the effects would be on the composition of capital flows and overall economic efficiency.  
Certainly the moral hazard generated by beliefs that governments would not allow large changes 
in exchange rates lead to excessive unhedged short term borrowing by many of the A sian 
countries.  Thus to many observers today, side effects of policies that would lead to reduction in 
the magnitude of financial flows to emerging markets would be counted as benefits rather than 
costs.  Hausmann [2000] presents a healthy corrective to those who would be too quickly 
inclined to adopt such a view.  He argues that there are many reasons to believe that the 
magnitude of capital flows to emerging markets tends to be sub rather than supra-optimal.  He 
fails to consider, however, the mounting evidence that the composition of capital flows can be 
quite important.  It is perfectly possible that the total volume of capital flows to emerging 
markets has been too low from the standpoint of economic efficiency, but that some types of 
capital flows have been excessive.   
Large short-term unhedged foreign borrowing played a key role in the Asian currency 
and financial crises.  There are strong arguments that at least in underdeveloped financial 
markets, foreign short-term borrowing is likely to generate pareto relevant negative externalities 
that call for some form of correction by government policies via prudential supervision and   13
regulation and/or various forms of corrective taxes on reserve requirements.  [See, for example, 
Eichengreen (1999) and Furman and Stiglitz (1998)].  Instead, in Asia many government policies 
such as implicit exchange-rate guarantees tended to further encourage rather than discourage 
unhedged short-term foreign borrowing. In Korea, liberalization of short-term before long-term 
capital flows, and in Thailand, tax incentives through the Bangkok International Banking Facility 
added to this problem. 
I have argued elsewhere (Willett and Denzau (1999) that as a complement to appropriate 
corrective policies toward some types of international financial flows, countries should also 
make such capital flow developments an important part of their management of international 
reserves.  In their contribution to the IADB volume, Calvo and Fernandez-Arias (2000) express 
skepticism about the usefulness of reserve management in this context and suggest that the 
greater are reserve levels, the greater will be capital outflows in a crisis.  This is clearly an 
important area for further research, but a number of recent empirical studies have found that low 
levels of international reserves in relation to either the domestic money supply or short term 
foreign debt are highly correlated with the severity of contagion and that high levels of reserves 
appear to offer a good deal of protection.
6  This suggests that there is a good deal that can be 
done with respect to the better management of both asset and liability dollarization short of 
adopting official currency dollarization.  Such considerations clearly do not tilt the balance of 
OCA criteria toward dollarization or other forms of fixed exchange rates.  The key question, 
however is how far is the shift?  Surely Hausmann [2000] goes too far when he argues that “in a 
floating economy that receives many real shocks, there is no incentive to save in national 
currency.” (p. 4) This is certainly true for very small, highly open economies, but not for larger 
ones.  Again, not all Latin American economies are the same.     14
5.  CONCLUDING EVALUATION OF THE POLICY ANALYSIS: BEYOND MORAL 
HAZARD VERSUS ORGINAL SIN 
For a largely uninformed audience, Hausmann chooses a very clear way to set up his 
article in Foreign Policy [1999].  The same tack is taken in his introduction to the IADB’s 
conference volume.  He sets up two contrasting views of the causes of the recent international 
financial crisis.  The first, the moral hazard view, sees pegged exchange rates as part of the 
problem and flexible rates as the solution.  The second, termed “original sin,” sees financial 
problems as stemming from underdeveloped financial markets and looks to the adoption of a 
supernational currency as the answer. 
In comparing the moral hazard and original sin hypotheses, Hausmann (2000) concludes 
that “the latter does a better job of explaining the facts” (p. 4).  Hausmann’s analysis is highly 
misleading, however.  First, the presentation of evidence is highly slanted.  Virtually all of the 
evidence presented is against the moral hazard view and in favor of the original sin hypothesis.  I 
have little quarrel with the evidence presented.  Indeed, my o wn research has also found 
considerable evidence against the hypothesis that moral hazard explains everything.  (See Willett 
(1998) and Willett et al (2001).  This extreme view, while not completely a strawman, has in fact 
been expounded by only a few.  Its refutation clearly demonstrates that moral hazard was not the 
whole story, but this doesn’t imply that moral hazard may not be an important part of the story.  
Hausmann seems to suggest that moral hazard has virtually no explanatory power.  He states that 
“the problem with the moral hazard thesis is that it fails to explain the facts” (p. 6).  This is true 
with respect to some of the facts, but far from all of them.  Even those who agree with 
Hausmann’s view that moral hazard did not play a significant role in generating the currency 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 See the analysis and references in Nitithanprapas and Willett (2000).   15
crises would find it hard to support the view that financial systems were not “distorted by moral 
hazard” (p. 6).
7 
There is overwhelming evidence to conclude that both moral hazard and original sin 
played nontrivial roles in the recent crises and also that neither is anywhere close to a complete 
explanation.  While Hausmann may well be right that original sin was more important than moral 
hazard, he does not present sufficient evidence for us to reach this conclusion. 
More importantly, even if conclusive evidence were found that original sin does have 
more explanatory power than moral hazard, Hausmann’s policy recommendation for 
dollarization for all of Latin America would not logically follow since other factors are also 
important.  He appropriately notes that dollarization is not a panacea and indicates that some 
costs would likely be involved, but his analysis excludes consideration of most of the traditional 
OCA criteria.  His emphasis on original sin is an important addition to the OCA criteria, but it is 
hard to believe that it is such an important consideration that it makes all of the others irrelevant.  
Thus while Hausmann deserves nines or tens for debating cleverness and for emphasizing 
important considerations, his score for balance must be very low. 
 
                                                 
7 For strong evidence that moral hazard affected risk premia on Korean banks, see Dooley and Shin (2000). 
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